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Now that we are live and going we will start have our match report done in a more timely fashion now we are in the swing again. But it would be a shame not to post this even a week after the game.

Pre-match

Chelsea against Liverpool is one of the highlights of the Premier League season during normal circumstances. But with You-Know-Who making his debut for the Stamford Bridge outfit, the stakes were even higher and much attention was made about the game surrounding on of the biggest transfer sagas in Premier League history.

Carlo Ancelotti benched the in-form Kalou to make space for Torres. But more importantly for the outcome of the game, he abandoned his well-drilled 4-3-3 in favour of the diamond shape that he used in his early days with the Blues. Torres and Drogba could therefore be shoe-horned into the starting line up as centre forwards.

Liverpool continued with their 5-3-1-1 formation which had got all three points against Stoke in the previous match. Carragher replaced Kyrgiakos at the back, with Maxi starting in favour of Aurelio in the centre of midfield. Suarez again could only make the bench, deemed not to be fit enough. If necessary, he could be used as an impact substitute later in the contest.

First Half

Nicolas Anelka had been impressive against Sunderland playing in the “hole” behind the strikers. As a trequartista, he kept his place at the tip of the midfield diamond with Torres and Drogba ahead of him. Behind the attacking three, the rest of the midfield was the standard Chelsea fare – Lampard and Essien as the central midfeilders with Mikel as the anchor man. Down the wings, Cole and Bosingwa were expected to drive forward and provide attacking width.

This was widely predicted before the game. The interesting tactical decisions were made by Liverpool. The back five (if we include the wing backs) was the same against Stoke except for Carragher replacing Kyrgiakos in the centre. The midfield in the previous game was delineated in two banks of two – like a box. In this match things were different. To counter Chelsea’s four central midfielders, Kenny Dalglish also arranged his midfielders in a diamond, going man-for-man in that area of the pitch. Lucas played deepest (against Anelka), Maxi and Gerrard in the centre (against Essien and Lampard) and Meireles played furthest forward (against Mikel).

Despite the mirrored shape, the roles and duties of the individuals in the Liverpool team were more complex. It is well-known that Chelsea (when playing with a diamond) lack width. They are totally reliant on their full backs to provide any attacking threat out wide while the midfield diamond dominates possession in the centre of the field. The two forwards are then given licence to roam around, but the emphasis is on the tip of the diamond to create openings for them. Dalglish and Clarke were well-prepared for such a predictable and uninspired tactical approach.

Liverpool’s back three were charged with dealing with Chelsea’s strikers, which left a spare defender as an insurance policy against the pace of Torres and the strength of Drogba. Lucas, as the deeper midfielder, had to nullify Anelka so that he could not pull the strings in the centre. He was largely successful – he won seven of his 13 attempted tackles, making also five interceptions and one block, all of them in or around his penalty area.

Anelka was reduced to making sideways passes or short passes from deep positions. Any attempts to play penetrating through balls were largely blocked or intercepted.

Meireles dropped deeper when Chelsea had the ball, coming level with Maxi and Gerrard in the centre of the park. This restricted the space available to Essien and Lampard to make meaningful passes. The result was that the Chelsea midfield could do nothing but make short, predictable passes. The limited Mikel didn’t stray from his main tactical instructions (“sit deep as the anchor man, and don’t do anything fancy”) which meant that he wasn’t able to push into the midfield and provide another outlet for the Chelsea attack. Liverpool’s compact line of midfielders suffocated Chelsea.

But how were Liverpool so well-drilled in the defensive phase, denying Chelsea the time and space to produce anything on the attack?

In the simplest terms, Liverpool outnumbered Chelsea in defence all over the pitch. The three centre backs outnumbered Chelsea’s two centre forwards. Lucas matched up (and beat) Anelka; meanwhile the rest of Chelsea’s static diamond was denied space by Liverpool’s more mobile midfield.

Out wide, Cole and Bosingwa were full backs, and therefore started from deep positions. They were unable to get forward far enough, quickly enough to provide any wide attacking outlets. And they were faced with their own problem. Liverpool’s wing backs were able to pin Cole and Bosingwa back with their attacking threat.

The best way to describe it is that Liverpool had two banks of three when they defended, with Lucas and the two wing backs able to act as sweepers against anyone who strayed away from them. Chelsea, with their static diamond and lack of intelligent movement, could not break those lines, since everywhere they were outnumbered.

As time went by, Liverpool also started to gain an advantage when they were attacking. The wing backs were far more adventurous going forward than Chelsea’s, knowing that they were covered by Lucas and the other midfielders. There was always a spare man to fill the space their attacking runs created.

This left Liverpool with five attacking midfielders (three in the centre and two wing backs) and one centre forward. Chelsea had more men in defence (seven: three central midfielders and the back four), but crucially Liverpool were able to provide much more width. Maxi and Gerrard were able to pull wide to help the wing backs overload Chelsea’s full backs. As a consequence, Liverpool looked much more dangerous.

It is worth noting that Liverpool’s diamond was much more flexible than Chelsea’s. The midfield trio of Maxi, Gerrard and Meireles all had the freedom to move wider and create a two-on-one advantage against Chelsea’s full backs. But they also had the freedom to push forward from deep positions. It was no great surprise that the only clear-cut chance of the first half came from Liverpool when Johnson and Gerrard were able to get wide into good crossing positions. This left Maxi unmarked at the far post.

Chelsea clearly lacked fluidity, and were congested in the centre of the pitch. They could not create any real danger like this. Other than Torres’s shot, blocked by Carragher, Chelsea created little; and even this was the result of a misplaced pass by Maxi.

The pressure therefore increased on the home side. Cech looked like he was about to deck Ivanovic towards the end of the half when a miscommunication resulted in both Eastern Europeans going for the same loose ball in the penalty area.

Second Half

Chelsea began the second half much brighter and with much more movement. But even in their best spell in the whole match they failed to create any significant openings. Only Essien’s long -range effort came anywhere near to testing Reina. Six shots resulted in zero on target. With no good service from the midfield and an inability to get into the Liverpool penalty area, Chelsea became more nervous and more prone to errors.

Chelsea’s nervousness only served to steel Liverpool. Dalglish’s side continued the good work from the first half, and were able to overload the flanks whilst imposing themselves on the centre of the field.

Ancelotti clearly sensed the need to change things, and he went for the obvious solution. Kalou came on for the ineffective Torres and changed back to the more-familiar 4-3-3. The plan was to deny the wing backs the room to come forward, but it wasn’t enough. Liverpool continued to outnumber Chelsea in the centre of the field in the defensive phase. The three central defenders plus Lucas were never going to be troubled by the three forwards (Drogba plus Anelka cutting in from the left and Kalou from the right).

The idea would have been for the wide forwards to drag out the wider central defenders. But Liverpool’s centre backs remained disciplined and kept to their central positions. With the midfield trio now only dealing with two Chelsea central players (Mikel continued to refuse to show any attacking ambition) Liverpool were still able to get their wing backs into the match.

The new plan from Chelsea lasted about three minutes. Liverpool broke with the one great counter-attack of the match. Gerrard came from the right to put a cross in that eluded the disorganised Chelsea defence. Meireles was free to hit a left-footed volley into the back of the net. The lack of communication which had resulted in Cech’s tête-à-tête with Ivanovic hit Chelsea again.

After taking the lead, the wing backs dropped much deeper, focused on combating Chelsea’s wide forwards. The side midfielders tracked the runs of Cole and Bosingwa. The lines of five and three totally nullified any threat from Ancelotti’s men, with Lucas sweeping the “hole” in between them.

For the last 15 minutes or so, Chelsea changed formation again, introducing Malouda and the other debutant David Luiz. They went 4-2-4, with Malouda and Kalou wide and Drogba and Anelka in the centre. That put Chelsea’s most influential midfielder, Lampard, even deeper and he was even less able to impose himself on the game. In the final 15 minutes, despite chasing the match, Lampard didn’t get a single pass into the Liverpool penalty area.

Ancelotti’s “plan C” had also failed. Liverpool’s defensively-minded 5-3-1-1 completely silenced Chelsea’s front four and the midfield duo. This was emphasised when Bosingwa was replaced by the less dynamic Ivanovic to make space for David Luiz in the centre. Chelsea’s 4-2-4 managed only three shots – none of them on target.

Post match

For the second game in a row, Dalglish and Clarke managed to tactically outwit their opposition with a similar formation and approach. It was purely a tactical victory at the Bridge, given that Liverpool were clearly everyone’s underdog before the match.

Yes, it was made possible in part due to Ancelotti’s lack of tactical flair. The desire (maybe need, given the hype) to play their new record signing resulted in a formation that played right into the hands of Liverpool, especially given the success they had gained against Stoke.

Chelsea also showed a lack of spirit – not a criticism one can usually level against them. More importantly the match exposed certain frayed relationships in the squad. Despite their January spending, Chelsea looked like a broken collection of individuals than a united unit.

On the other hand, Liverpool’s players were superb – both in their individual performances and ability to work together to stick to the game plan.

I’ll end on an interesting statistic – the goal that Liverpool scored was their first Premier League goal at Stamford Bridge since Benoit Cheyrou in 2003.